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FOREWORD
Susan A. Bandes*t
The conference that led to this symposium, "Emotion in Context:
Exploring the Interaction between Emotions and Legal Institutions," took
place at the University of Chicago Law School in May 2008, exactly a
decade after the first-and seminal-University of Chicago Law School
conference on law and emotion.' Significant progress has been made during
those ten years. The study of law and emotion has become an accepted
focus of legal scholarship.2 The inquiry has shifted from whether emotion
plays a role in legal reasoning to how emotion and legal reason interact, and
to which emotions ought to play a role in particular legal contexts. As legal
scholar Terry Maroney summarizes the developments in the field:
Early efforts had successfully shifted the baseline, creating
some broad agreement that it is both undesirable and impossible
to exclude emotion from legal analysis. Scholars then began to
complicate the model. They recognized that embracing an
explicit role for emotion in law is an inherently normative
* Distinguished Research Professor, DePaul University College of Law; Visiting Professor,
University of Chicago Law School, 2007-2008.
t Many thanks are due to those who made this symposium possible, as well as those who
contributed to the success of the conference from which the papers in this symposium volume arose.
Oliver Goodenough played an important role in both endeavors. He graciously helped facilitate the
publication of the symposium papers in the Vermont Law Review, and acted as faculty advisor to the
symposium. The members of the Senior Editorial Board of the Vermont Law Review and particularly
Micaela Tucker, the Senior Articles Editor, deserve special thanks for their professionalism and
assiduous work on this volume.
Oliver Goodenough, along with Monika Gruter Cheney and Jeanne Giaccia of the Gruter
Institute for Law and Behavioral Research, first suggested to me that we should organize this conference
in order to continue the interdisciplinary conversation fostered by our February 2007 conference, "Law
and the Emotions: New Directions in Scholarship," at the University of California, Berkeley. Thus they
provided much of the impetus and initial encouragement, as well as generous intellectual, practical, and
financial support for the 2008 "Emotions and Institutions" conference. Saul Levmore, dean of the
University of Chicago Law School, Richard Epstein, as a colleague and as director of the John M. Olin
Program in Law and Economics, and Glen Weissenberger, dean of DePaul University College of Law,
were likewise generous in contributing intellectual, practical, and financial support for the conference.
Thanks are also due to the contributors to this volume, Scott A. Anderson, Mary Anne Case, Kevin M.
Clermont, Christoph Engel, Richard A. Epstein, Oliver R. Goodenough, and Cass R. Sunstein. And
finally, I am grateful to Martha C. Nussbaum for her support and guidance in the organization of the
conference, for her contributions to the conference, and for her insight and wisdom into the relationship
between law and emotion.
1. I organized the May 1998 conference on law and emotion in conjunction with Martha
Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago Law
School. The conference led to the book THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 1999).
2. For an excellent discussion of the breadth of scholarship on the topic, see generally Terry
A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAv.
119 (2006).
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enterprise, and began to advocate more careful attention to the
complexity of emotion theory within other disciplines.'3
The next frontier is to explore emotions not as fixed and internal
states but as dynamic processes that shape and are shaped by social and
institutional context. Twenty-five years ago, in The Managed Heart, Arlie
Hochschild's groundbreaking work on the sociology of emotion,
Hochschild identified the tendency to treat emotions as private and
internal as one of the major barriers to serious inquiry into the nature of
emotions.4 This tendency remains strong. Psychologist Dacher Keltner,
Director of the Berkeley Social Interaction Laboratory, estimates that at
least 90% of all studies of emotion involve individual subjects. The
failure to study emotions as they take shape in (and help shape) the social
world impoverishes our ability to construct and maintain fair and effective
legal institutions.
It is becoming increasingly clear that understanding these dynamics is
an interdisciplinary project.6 Recently, a number of disciplines have begun
focusing on emotion in social context. The sociology of emotion is now a
burgeoning field.7 Psychologists are increasingly interested in emotion and
social cognition, emotional dynamics in group settings,8 and the interaction
between emotion and culture.9 Political scientists are beginning to think
about the role of emotion in democratic deliberation. 10 The emerging field
of affective neuroscience is examining the neural dynamics of emotional
interchange. One of its founders, Richard Davidson, observes: "You can't
3. Maroney, supra note 2, at 122 (citation omitted) (citing Susan A. Bandes, Empathy,
Narrative and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 364--65 (1996)).
4. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN
FEELING 201-03 (1st ed.1983).
5. Email from Dacher Keltner, Professor, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, to author (May 2, 2007) (on
file with author).
6. See, e.g., Arvid Kappas, The Science of Emotion as a Multidisciplinary Research
Paradigm, 60 BEHAV. PROCESSES 85, 87-88 (2002) (explaining that multiple disciplines contribute to
the research programs that study emotion).
7. JONATHAN H. TURNER & JAN E. STETS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS 1 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Eliot R. Smith, Charles R. Seger & Diane M. Mackie, Can Emotions be Truly
Group Level? Evidence Regarding Four Conceptual Criteria, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
431 (2007).
9. See, e.g., PAULA M. NIEDENTHAL ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION: INTERPERSONAL,
EXPERIENTIAL, AND COGNITIVE APPROACHES (2006).
10. See, e.g., SHARON KRAUSE, CIVIL PASSIONS: MORAL SENTIMENT AND DEMOCRATIC
DELIBERATION (2008); GEORGE LAKOFF, THE POLITICAL MIND: WHY YOU CAN'T UNDERSTAND 2 1ST-
CENTURY AMERICAN POLITICS WITH AN 18TH-CENTURY BRAIN (2008); GEORGE E. MARCUS, THE
SENTIMENTAL CITIZEN: EMOTION IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2002); DREw WESTEN, THE POLITICAL
BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION (2007).
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separate the cause of an emotion from the world of relationships-our
social interactions are what drive our emotions.""1
We know that emotions are not formed, experienced, or expressed in a
vacuum. There are likely some basic emotions that exist across cultures, 12
but even as to those, social context shapes not only how they are
communicated to others, but also how they are formed, experienced, and
interpreted by the individual.' 3 And once intergroup behavior is added to
the mix, questions arise both about how the expression and interpretation of
emotion change in a group context, and about how an emotional climate
may arise in a group-through mechanisms like emotional contagion and
synchronization. 14
In short, in a range of disciplines, scholars are just beginning to delve
into the complex dynamics of group emotion and individual emotion in
group contexts. Given the fact that the legal system seeks to channel human
behavior, knowledge about these dynamics is essential to the success of the
legal endeavor. We design and maintain legal institutions based on implicit
and explicit assumptions about human behavior. For example, institutions
are constructed in light of assumptions about how people individually or
collectively respond to new information, how they assess risks, how they
decide whom to trust or fear, what will encourage them to cooperate for
common goals, what motivates them to punish, when they will forgive, and
when they will seek vengeance. The interdisciplinary study of emotion has
offered valuable insights into whether these assumptions about human
behavior are well grounded. The next step is to explore how generalizable
11. DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS
83 (2006) (quoting Richard Davidson, Director, Lab. for Affective Neuroscience, Univ. of Wis.); see
also Richard J. Davidson & Steven K. Sutton, Affective Neuroscience: The Emergence of a Discipline, 5
CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 217 (1995).
12. The extent to which emotions are biologically rooted is also an important and burgeoning
area of study. See, e.g., ANTONIO DAMASiO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN
THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 51 (1999). Damasio refers to a group of primary or universal
emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust, and to a larger group of secondary or
social emotions, and argues that although culture and learning can alter the expression and meaning of
emotions, all share a biological core. See also Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and
Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REv. 1121, 1140-41 (2002) (discussing biologically rooted taste for apology
and forgiveness); Peggy A. Thoits, The Sociology of Emotions, 15 ANN. REV. SOC. 317, 320 (1989)
(noting the ongoing debate about socially constructed versus basic or biologically rooted emotions);
Andrew Ortony & Terence J. Turner, What's Basic About Basic Emotions?, 97 PSYCHOL. REV. 315, 315
(1990) (raising the possibility that the concept of basic emotions is an article of faith).
13. See, e.g., TURNER & STETS, supra note 7, at I (analyzing how emotions are conceptualized
sociologically).
14. See, e.g., Sigal G. Barsade, The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and its Influence on
Group Behavior, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 644 (2002). The preceding two paragraphs draw heavily from Susan
Bandes, Victims, "Closure, " and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2009).
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these insights are. In other words, do emotional dynamics that operate in
any particular context remain stable across institutional contexts? It seems
likely that context affects emotions greatly. To take a few examples, rules
seeking to promote forgiveness might be workable and desirable in victim-
offender mediation involving juvenile offenders, but not in capital
litigation, domestic-violence court, or national truth and reconciliation
commissions. Individual risk preferences may vary depending on
institutional settings, and these preferences may affect the design of health
plans, environmental protections, or contract-enforcement mechanisms. The
dynamics of emotional contagion in jury deliberations may differ from
those in negotiation settings or stratified workplaces. The more closely
scholars study emotions in particular contexts, the more helpful and
nuanced their findings are likely to be.
This symposium considers the interaction between emotion and
institutions in a range of contexts and through a range of disciplinary lenses.
The emotions and emotional capacities discussed include guilt, indignation,
anger, moral outrage, happiness, "liking," and the capacity for empathy.
Several of the articles in this volume look not just at particular emotions,
but at emotional phenomena or mechanisms that influence decision-
making15-for example, somatic markers (or the related concepts of
salience and accessibility), affective forecasting, implicit bias, attitude
polarization, moral dumbfounding, and moral numbing. 16 The articles
consider how these emotions, capacities, and mechanisms intersect with,
among others, sexual harassment in the workplace, capital punishment
trials, punitive damages in tort suits, jury instructions explaining burdens of
proof, legislative regulation of risk, legislative policy bearing on wealth and
property, societal responsibility for the elderly, and intellectual property
law. They draw on psychology, philosophy, economics, cognitive
neuroscience, and sociology to shed light on the interactions they discuss.
Oliver Goodenough poses several of the overarching questions that
emotion scholars will need to address as the study of institutional structure
and function progresses. As he usefully points out, institutions are not
solely the product of conscious design: "[E]volutionary processes can also
lead to the emergence of institutions and to their instantiation in a variety of
forms and locations."' 7 Institutional norms and mechanisms may be
15. See Maroney, supra note 2, at 126 tbl.1 (presenting several analytical approaches to law
and emotion).
16. For discussion of the question of how "emotion" ought to be defined, see Bandes, supra
note 14; JEROME KAGAN, WHAT IS EMOTION? HISTORY, MEASURES, AND MEANINGS (2007).
17. Oliver R. Goodenough, Institutions, Emotions, and Law: A Goldilocks Problem for
Mechanism Design, 33 VT. L. REV. 395 (2009).
[Vol. 33:387
Foreword
imbedded in internalized psychological expectations and assumptions. Thus
he suggests that current work on how our emotions link with our internal
psychological commitments can be usefully mined for insights about how
legal institutions can effectively channel social inclinations toward
cooperation and conflict. Law may reflect internalized norms, but may also
be needed at precisely the point at which such norms, or moral intuitions,
leave off. Law may intervene to supplement or supplant our intuitions when
our reactions are "affectively cold" (for example, our intuitions toward the
protection of intellectual property), or to slow them down when they are
"overly hot" (for example, our initial angry or vengeful reactions in the
wake of a shocking crime or an outrageous financial arrangement like the
current AIG bonus imbroglio).
Cass Sunstein evaluates institutional arrangements in light of current
neuroscientific knowledge about dual-system processing. In his view, a
primary role of legal institutions is to ensure that quick, automatic, intuitive
judgments (System 1) are subject to override, when necessary, by slower,
more reflective judgments (System 2). In his paper for this symposium, he
considers moral indignation as a species of intuitive, System 1 processing,
in contexts including homicide trials, administrative and legislative risk
regulation, and punitive damages assessments. As he explains, the lessons
to be drawn from the dual-processing model are complex. The two systems
are not necessarily antithetical. More accurately, they act in concert. Moral
indignation, for example, is a valuable signal of norm violation and can be a
valuable prod to action. Moral indignation can work to inform our evolving
legal judgments. For instance, he suggests that revulsion about sexual
harassment helped move the law toward a more expansive conception of
discrimination. Eventually these understandings might "migrate" to,'8 or
inform, our more deliberative System 2 thinking about legal rights and
remedies. Nevertheless, moral indignation often needs to be tempered or
subjected to the demands of coherence. It can lead to a narrow frame based
on individual vivid accounts. The legal system's responsibility is to
"produce institutional safeguards to ensure against the risk that legal and
political outcomes will respond to unjustifiably intense indignation, or that
democratic societies will remain passive simply because the relevant harms
are not of the sort that stir System l."19
My article considers the claim that anger, outrage, and the other strong
emotions provoked by repellent crimes interfere with rational deliberation.
There is no doubt that heinous murders and other shocking crimes place an
18. Cass R. Sunstein, Some Effects of Moral Indignation, 33 VT. L. REV. 405 (2009).
19. Id. at433.
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enormous strain on the criminal justice system and may exert a destructive
influence on institutional process. I argue, however, that before considering
how anger interferes with rational deliberation, it is necessary to explore
more fully the concept of rational deliberation. I argue for an understanding
of rational deliberation that recognizes its pervasive emotional content. The
legal system tends to marginalize certain approaches and responses as
"emotional," and therefore off-limits, based on misconceptions about the
nature of emotion. In large part, these misconceptions reflect the failure to
view emotions as dynamic processes that take shape in the social world.
The law, instead, tends to view emotions as private and internal, and as
unaffected by institutional, social, cultural, or temporal context.
I illustrate the consequences of these misconceptions in one particular
context: the capital punishment arena. There, as elsewhere, the legal
system tends to take three approaches to emotion: requiring it to be "set
aside" (e.g., the antisympathy instruction), permitting it to be
"introduced" (e.g., the victim impact statement), and ignoring it (e.g., the
refusal to clarify the meaning of life without parole despite evidence that
juries misunderstand the term).
Scott Anderson draws on moral philosophy to examine the role of guilt
(an emotion that has, rather surprisingly, received very little attention in the
law-and-emotion literature) in expanding the ambit of our ethical and moral
responsibility. In doing so, he asks an essential question, and one that
bedevils many emotion theorists: Assuming emotions are partially
cognitive, do the emotions convey any valuable information beyond that
contained in their cognitive components? He concludes that the emotion of
guilt may help create a sense of ethical connectedness between individuals
and their moral communities. He further posits that this expanded sense of
community may supply the impetus to create institutions that can act on
behalf of collective needs, such as the needs of the elderly, the disabled, or
other marginalized groups that might otherwise be left to fend for
themselves. Conversely, institutions may relieve individuals of guilt for
some conditions that are better addressed on an institutional level.
Mary Anne Case also considers the relationship between internalized
norms and external institutional structure. In the context of sexual
harassment in the workplace, she argues that law is necessary but not
sufficient. Like Anderson, Case explores the ability of internally held
emotional commitments to influence institutional commitments. She argues
for an internalized incest taboo prohibiting sex between employees in a
reporting relationship. She observes that in many workplace harassment
situations, although the law assumes a binary relationship between victim
and perpetrator, in fact "it is hard to see who the unaffected third parties
[Vol. 33:387
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are. '20 The incest taboo would reflect and instantiate a broader notion of
harm than the one that currently animates sexual harassment law. Case
warns that dating and sexual intimacy represent only one aspect of the
larger problem of favoritism and coercion in the workplace, and raises the
fascinating question of whether "liking," affection, bonding, and friendship
should be subject to regulation as well.
Christoph Engel and Kevin Clermont contribute an intriguing debate
about the emotional dynamics surrounding jury instructions on burdens of
proof. Engel argues that Continental European instructions, which demand
that the trier of fact subjectively believe a party's claim in order to find in
favor of that party, have the effect of making the decision-maker's
responsibility salient. He compares this approach to that used in the United
States, which tends to ask for an objective weighing of factors or
assessment of probabilities. In Engel's view, the U.S. system reflects not
only a different epistemological approach to the possibility of ascertaining
truth, but also a fear of the intuitive, automatic system of decision-making.
For Engel, the Continental approach induces the decision-maker to invest
more cognitive time and effort and to remain open to a greater complexity
of thought. It makes salient the risks of a faulty or questionable verdict.
Cognitive science teaches that human judgment is prone to "coherence
shifts": once we settle on a convincing narrative, we begin to undervalue
evidence that conflicts with this story. Articulated standards of proof are an
important reminder that these coherence shifts occur and that we must
vigilantly guard against them. Engel also argues that the Continental
approach is a more accurate reflection of the way in which decision-makers
actually arrive at their verdicts.
Kevin Clermont raises a number of concerns about Engel's claims.
Most centrally, he views the question of level of confidence in a verdict as
distinct from the question of burden of proof-a decision-maker may be
highly confident, as a subjective matter, that a verdict meets a low standard
of proof (e.g., preponderance of the evidence) as an objective matter. For
Clermont, the question of the decision-maker's subjective feelings is not
one that law should address. The crucial role of standards of proof is "to
force the fact-finder, in the final decisional step, to link its inside mental
state to the outside real world.",
21
Richard Epstein asks, "What does an accurate account of human nature
tell us about the choice of a desirable set of social institutions?, 22 The
20. Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest Taboo in the Workplace,
33 VT. L. REv. 551, 554 (2009).
21. Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 VT. L. REv. 469,483 (2009).
22. Richard A. Epstein, Happiness and Revealed Preferences in Evolutionary Perspective, 33
2009]
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particular question of human nature on which he focuses here is the
burgeoning literature on happiness, and the challenges it poses to the
account on which neoclassical economics is premised. His stated goal is not
to defend the classical model, but "to offer a sympathetic but critical
evaluation of this worldview in terms of evolutionary theory, which, when
properly understood, bolsters the case for the classical liberal synthesis of
legal norms and institutions. 23 In doing so, he critiques the tendency of the
happiness literature to reduce all "emotional states to a single notion of
happiness or utility.,' 24 He raises concerns about the reliance on survey
methods as a means of measuring happiness, arguing for the importance
of approaching the data with caution and supplementing it with common-
sense observation of human behavior. He concludes that a more nuanced
account of happiness, and, more broadly, of what it is that motivates
people, will reveal that the happiness literature provides no reason to
reassess current understandings of the role of social institutions in guiding
social interactions.
Legal institutions have always been constructed according to
assumptions about emotional dynamics. The problem is that these
assumptions are too rarely subjected to scrutiny in light of the growing
body of interdisciplinary knowledge about how we in fact make decisions
about our own behavior and the behavior of others. The articles in this
symposium demonstrate how much can be accomplished when scholars
from a range of disciplines explore and debate the interaction between
emotions and institutions. They also make clear how many of the questions
are still being formulated, and how much work remains to be done.
VT. L. REv. 559, 559 (2009).
23. Id. at 560.
24. Id. at 570.
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